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4.1 Introduction
The government has always been the dominant figure in the corporate
landscape of Korea. This is not surprising, considering that Korea has a
relatively short history of capitalism and that the government played a de-
cisive role in the fast industrialization process that began in the 1960s. An
important aspect of the economic development strategy of the successive
administrations was the creation of large firms in modern industries that
realize economies of scale and scope. Many large commercial Korean
firms were established by the chaebol system, which crucially depended on
the government’s intervention in the financial market. Following the heavy
and chemical industry drive of the mid-1970s, the automobile, shipbuild-
ing, electronics, chemical, and oil refinery industries, as well as a host of
others (including construction), were erected in this manner.1
The government’s involvement has been more direct in the remaining in-
dustries that require large amounts of capital to start and maintain the
business. The government owned and operated all of the major network in-
dustries, including telephony, postal services, electricity, gas, water, and
rail transportation. It also owned and operated other large firms in manu-
facturing industries such as the tobacco and steel industries. All of these in-
dustries began virtually as government monopolies. The government also
owned and operated monopolistic suppliers in minting, textbook publish-
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ing, and several other industries whose main customer was the government
itself. In addition, the government owned or invested in a score of firms in
competitive industries such as newspapers, venture capital, coal mining,
and chemicals. Furthermore, some bankrupt private firms were acquired
by public enterprises and became public enterprises themselves. Finally,
the government controlled and partly owned much of the financial sector
for a long period before it nationalized much of the industry in the after-
math of the recent economic crisis.
The above-listed commercial businesses owned and controlled by the
government took several diﬀerent legal forms: government agencies, pub-
lic corporations, and gongdan.2 For instance, rail transportation has been
operating as a government agency within the transportation department,
while telecommunications was transformed from a similar government
agency into a public corporation. However, almost all of the commercial
businesses owned and controlled by the government were perceived mainly
as policy instruments rather than money-making firms, regardless of the
form they took.
One consequence of such a command-and-control approach was the
lack of separation among public enterprises’ conflicting objectives. Policy
objectives were generally not clearly separated from commercial goals. For
network industries, separation among industrial policies, regulatory func-
tions, and commercial operation was generally absent. Thus, the line min-
istry was charged with regulatory power on the one hand and the author-
ity to make key business decisions for the monopolistic supplier under its
control on the other.3 Further, it pursued a wide range of industrial policy
objectives that were often in conflict with the other two objectives.
Although no rigorous empirical analysis has been conducted, it is widely
believed that most of the public enterprises had serious problems in mana-
gerial eﬃciency due to conflicting goals and absence of clear accountabil-
ity for various cost-inducing activities. Casual observation and scattered
pieces of information all suggest that there were serious irregularities
within most public enterprises.4 Scandals involving the procurement prac-
tices of public enterprises were not infrequent. Decisions on hiring, ap-
pointment of employees to various positions, promotions, and rewards
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2. A gongdan is a nonprofit public foundation based on public laws.
3. The line ministry of a public enterprise is the ministry that is in charge of the industry to
which the public enterprise belongs as well as policies relevant to the industry. Every public
enterprise has its line ministry. The line ministry of a public enterprise has a wide range of au-
thority over the relevant industry, including policy development, regulation of firms in the in-
dustry, and the control of the public enterprise.
4. It is interesting to note that while it is hard for anyone familiar with public enterprises to
deny that they were ineﬃcient, it is also hard to establish that large private firms were more
eﬃcient than public enterprises. Comparison of various indices on the financial performance
of public enterprises and large private firms generally indicates that the latter fared worse. In
fact, more than one-third of large chaebol firms have ended up bankrupt since 1997.
were often made based on factors that were seldom related to the prof-
itability of the public enterprises.
There have been two waves of reform eﬀorts aimed at privatizing the
public-enterprise sector. In late 1997, the Kim Young Sam administration
introduced the Act for Privatization and Improvement of the Eﬃciency of
Large Public Enterprises, generally referred to as the “Special Act on Pri-
vatization,” to promote privatization of four large public enterprises.5 The
act aimed at reforming corporate governance structures of commercial
public enterprises to be privatized, while at the same time preventing take-
over by chaebols during their privatization. The second wave of reform, ini-
tiated by the current administration that came to power at the peak of the
economic crisis, is still unfolding. The current administration turned over
large shares of public enterprises to private hands. It is also transforming
the electricity industry from a vertically integrated public-enterprise
monopoly into a competitive industry operated by private interests. How-
ever, full privatization of a large public enterprise has yet to occur.
In short, privatization is still proceeding and is far from complete. Thus,
it is too early to quantitatively evaluate the outcome of the policies toward
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) being privatized with any precision.6 In-
stead, our goal in this paper is to give an accurate description of the key as-
pects of the public-enterprise sector in Korea, as well as the privatization
process, and to identify the remaining issues. In addition, this paper deals
with the chaebol problem that worked as a barrier to privatization.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of the
public-enterprise sector, encompassing the institutional frameworks gov-
erning public enterprises and their characteristics and positions in relevant
markets. Section 4.3 provides key financial information on public enter-
prises, including revenues, profits, and debt-equity ratios. This section also
compares the performance of large SOEs with that of chaebol firms. One
notable finding is that large SOEs are generally more eﬃcient than chaebol
firms. Section 4.4 describes the main elements of the 1997 Special Act on
Privatization and analyzes the factors that led to the introduction of the act
as well as its eﬀect. Section 4.5 summarizes the privatization policies of the
new administration and their results. This section deals with both institu-
tional changes and divestiture of the government’s shares and also provides
analysis of some of the crucial events. Sections 4.2 through 4.5 are devoted
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5. Nam and Kang (1998) oﬀer an extensive analysis of the Special Act and of other key is-
sues regarding the public-enterprise sector in Korea.
6. For instance, comparison of costs before and after privatization is not possible for most
large commercial SOEs because they have been only partially privatized and are generally still
controlled by the government. There are several small SOEs that have been completely priva-
tized and are now controlled by private investors, but a meaningful quantitative comparison
of eﬃciency before and after privatization is also diﬃcult since they have been privatized only
recently.
to twenty-six nonfinancial corporations in which the government is the
dominant shareholder or in a controlling position. Section 4.6 explains
other forms of commercial organizations owned and controlled by the gov-
ernment, and the final section draws conclusions.
4.2 An Overview of the Public-Enterprise Sector Prior to 1998
4.2.1 Institutional Environment
At the end of September 1997 there were twenty-six nonfinancial corpo-
rations in which the government was the sole owner or had controlling in-
terests.7 Many of them had several subsidiaries in which they held control-
ling interests.8 Most of the twenty-six corporations had strong commercial
elements in the nature of their business. Some of them, such as Korea Tele-
com (KT) and Korea Tobacco and Ginseng (KT&G), started as govern-
ment agencies and were later transformed into corporations. Some others,
such as Pohang Steel Co. (POSCO), were established as corporations from
the beginning. Korea Heavy was established as a result of the merger
among three ailing private firms, which were acquired by a consortium
headed by Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO).9
The twenty-six public enterprises were perceived by the government pri-
marily as policy instruments rather than profit-seeking business organiza-
tions. Consequently, the shareholders’ rights of each of them were given to
a line ministry, which put priority on policy considerations in exercising the
rights.10 Some of the public enterprises had their own corporation acts,
such as the KEPCO Act and KT&G Act, which made it clear that they
were established to serve public policy objectives and explicitly gave the
line ministry control of the respective public enterprise. All of the govern-
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7. 1997 is a good year for comparison with the current year because it is the last year of the
old regime, which had been quite stable since the late 1980s. The public-enterprise sector be-
gan to change in a fundamental way in November 1997, after the newly introduced Special
Act on Privatization took eﬀect.
8. Some of the twenty-six corporations are subsidiaries of one of the twenty-six public
enterprises, at least in terms of ownership. For instance, Korea Electric Power Corporation
(KEPCO), the vertically integrated monopoly in the electricity industry, was the second-
largest shareholder of Korea Heavy, which was the monopolist in the generator industry.
KEPCO was also the second-largest shareholder, after the government, of Korea Gas Cor-
poration (KOGAS), the monopolist in the importing stage as well as in the wholesale stage of
the gas industry. However, it should also be noted that KEPCO did not exercise or attempt to
exercise control of these two public enterprises; the government maintained exclusive control
of them.
9. Korea Heavy is not the only firm to become a public enterprise as a result of rationali-
zation measures for bankrupt private firms. For instance, Hanyang, which was once a leading
construction company, went bankrupt and was acquired by the Korea Housing Corporation
as a part of the rationalization measures applied to Hanyang and its stakeholders.
10. For instance, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy (MOCIE) used its con-
trol over KEPCO to pursue its own policy objectives, while the Ministry of Information and
Communications (MIC) exercised its control over Korea Telecom.
ment-owned corporations had such acts,11 while among the government-
invested corporations, only Korea Broadcasting System, Korea Chemical,
and KTB were subject to such acts.12 Whereas the rest of the government-
invested corporations were not subject to such individual corporation acts,
they were still controlled by their respective line ministries, although to a
lesser degree.13
Some of the twenty-six corporations were also subject to the industry
acts that govern the firms in an industry to which a public enterprise be-
longed. Public enterprises that were monopolistic or dominant in their in-
dustries were significantly aﬀected by the industry acts, as they constituted
all or much of the relevant industries. In addition, some of the twenty-six
public enterprises that were classified as government-owned corporations
by the Framework Act were subject to additional constraints set by that act.
Corporations in which the government had a controlling interest were,
and still are, classified into two groups: government-owned corporations
(GOCs, or tooja-gigwan) and government-invested corporations (GICs, or
choolja-gigwan), depending on whether they were subject to the Frame-
work Act for GOCs. The general rule that diﬀerentiated GOCs from GICs
was government ownership. In October 1997, all of the twenty-six corpo-
rations (except Korea Broadcasting System) in which the government’s
share was 50 percent or higher were subject to the Framework Act. The
reason that Korea Broadcasting System, which was and still is 100 percent
owned by the government, was exempt from the Framework Act is not
clear.
Government-owned corporations were generally perceived as more
closely related with public policy objectives. In other words, GICs were
viewed as having stronger commercial elements by the government and
were thus allowed to enjoy greater freedom in their operations. In particu-
lar, GOCs were subject to the restrictions set by the Framework Act, which
was similar in many respects to the set of restrictions applied to govern-
ment agencies. The Framework Act basically perceives a GOC as a sub-
sidiary of the line ministry and tries to constrain the management of the
GOC to achieve the policy objectives set by the line ministry with as little
cost as possible.
Table 4.1 summarizes the main businesses and market positions of
twenty-six GOCs and GICs. As one can see from the table, almost all
GOCs are monopolies in their respective markets. Most GOCs sell their
goods or services mostly to the government. On the other hand, all of the
GICs sell their goods or services to nongovernment consumers.
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11. For instance, KT was subject to the KT Act, and KEPCO was subject to the KEPCO
Act.
12. Explained further in the next paragraph.
13. For instance, POSCO was controlled by MOCIE, which used its control over POSCO
to keep domestic steel prices from exceeding a certain level.
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4.2.2 Governance of Public Enterprises Prior to November 1997
Who are the stakeholders of SOEs? Who controls them, and to what
ends? Stakeholders of SOEs include employees and managers, just as in
private firms. But the most important stakeholders are the bureaucrats and
politicians. Bureaucrats and politicians control SOEs, as they control the
government, who owns SOEs. The nature of ownership and control of an
SOE diﬀers fundamentally from that of a private firm in two respects. First,
as the owner or a dominant shareholder, the government pursues not only
financial return but policy objective as well. Second, bureaucrats and
politicians who control SOEs on behalf of the general public have no per-
sonal financial stake in SOEs, unlike shareholders of private firms.
Pursuing two potentially conflicting goals often led to suboptimal out-
comes in the overall performance. Designing proper incentive mechanisms
that motivate managers and employees of SOEs to try to hit the right bal-
ance between policy goals and financial goals became increasingly diﬃcult
as the size of the operation of SOEs became larger, while the overall econ-
omy became larger and more sophisticated. Properly allocating authority
over SOEs among various government branches became increasingly diﬃ-
cult. As a result, the governance structure of SOEs has evolved over time,
responding to the changes in economic conditions.
The governance of a public enterprise before the introduction of the
1997 Special Act on Privatization depended on whether it was subject to
the Framework Act. The Framework Act required that a GOC board con-
sist of a member from the line ministry and another from the then–Eco-
nomic Planning Board,14 and the rest from outside the government. The
board members who were not from the government were mainly lawyers
and professors appointed by the government. The board reviewed and
made decisions on the issues of importance, such as key investment deci-
sions and appointment of executives. In reviewing and making decisions
on the agenda, the board was required by the act to put priority on public
policy considerations.
Although there were nine board members, the one from the line ministry
played a decisive role. The board member from the economic planning
board played a secondary role of checking for wasteful activities. The re-
maining members from outside the government generally were not ex-
pected to play a significant role and usually approved an agenda that had
already been negotiated by the two members from the government. The
board member from the line ministry intervened heavily with the manage-
ment of a GOC. The board members were paid only token amounts of
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14. The Economic Planning Board was charged with the task of planning and budgeting as
well as that of coordinating economic policies of various ministries. The board later merged
with the Ministry of Finance.
money for their services and did not have any monetary incentives in the fi-
nancial performance of the public enterprise for which they worked.
The chief executive oﬃcers of the GOCs were selected by the government
without active participation of the board. Political appointment was not
rare. The rest of the top executives were usually selected from the bureau-
cracy of the GOCs themselves. Appointment of ex–government oﬃcials to
a GOC position other than chief executive oﬃcer was barred by law. Exec-
utive pay was generally lower than that in private firms. Incentive-based
management contracts were not used. Top executives, in particular the chief
executive oﬃcers, usually considered themselves as bureaucrats belonging
to the government rather than executives of a business organization.
The GOCs had to submit annual budget plans to the government, which
regularly evaluated their performance. In addition to being subject to a
strict quota on the number of employees and the number of managerial po-
sitions, they were also regularly audited by the Oﬃce of the Inspector Gen-
eral and the National Assembly.
The corporate governance of GICs was similar to that of GOCs, al-
though GICs were not subject to any law that specified a particular gover-
nance model. However, they were granted more autonomy compared with
GOCs. The line ministry generally was given shareholder’s rights and could
successfully control a GIC in a way that suited its policy objectives.
One peculiar aspect of the public enterprises in Korea is that, although
they were oﬃcially treated as policy instruments, many of them had private
shareholders. The best example is KEPCO, which was and still is a GOC
subject to the Framework Act as well as the KEPCO Act and the Electric-
ity Industry Act. The three acts all stipulate that KEPCO should be run
primarily as an instrument that the government could use in pursuing its
policy objectives related to the electricity industry. In reality, KEPCO has
indeed been run basically as a policy instrument, as the acts intended; but
the government sold its shares of KEPCO in several tranches to private in-
vestors, including a large number of foreign investors. Korea Telecom is
another example. The first tranche of KT shares was sold to domestic in-
vestors in 1994 while KT was a GOC. Sales of GOC shares to private in-
vestors raise the question about the nature of those GOCs.15
4.3 Sizes and Financial Performance of Public Enterprises
4.3.1 Size of Operation and Financial Performance of Public Enterprises
This section attempts to describe SOEs in key aspects, such as size, prof-
itability, and financial stability. After summarizing key statistics for large
Recent Developments in the Public-Enterprise Sector of Korea 103
15. It is not clear to me why the investors purchased the shares of KT and KEPCO at the
time.
SOEs, we compare the performance of commercial SOEs with that of chae-
bol firms.
Table 4.2 contains key statistics for the twenty-six GOCs and GICs. For
most GOCs that sell their services almost exclusively to the government,
profits do not seem to be an important measure of managerial eﬃciency.
Revenues of these public enterprises may be viewed as budgets allocated to
them by the government for certain activities they perform on behalf of the
government. Korea Coal Corporation kept accumulating large amounts
of losses, as it was supposed to subsidize failing coal mines. Such large los-
ses are not a result of internal ineﬃciency of Korea Coal. Similarly, large
revenues or profits of GOCs such as Korea Trade Investment Promotion
Agency, Korea National Housing, Korea Highway Corporation, and Ko-
rea Land Corporation are not likely to be a result of their internal eﬃciency.
Some GICs that look promising in table 4.2 may not be profit-oriented,
eﬃcient business organizations. For instance, Korea Broadcasting System
is not considered to be a profit-oriented business organization, although it
has enjoyed the status of a GIC for quite a while. Its stable profitability
comes mainly from a guaranteed source of revenue, fees collected from all
television owners.16 The other two network broadcasting companies (Mun-
hwa Broadcasting Corporation and Korea Broadcasting System) are not
entitled to the TV viewing fees. Korea Broadcasting System is also compet-
ing with the other two networks in the market for advertisement time.17
The public enterprises for which meaningful discussions on commercial
performance can be made are the “Big Six” and a handful of GICs. The Big
Six are KEPCO, KT, KT&G, POSCO, Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS),
and Korea Heavy. Among the Big Six commercial public enterprises,
KOGAS and Korea Heavy did not earn as much profit as the other four.
KOGAS is still in the stage of building a national transmission network
and has been investing more cash than it has generated. Korea Heavy de-
pends on KEPCO, one of its major shareholders, for a large part of its rev-
enue. As a consequence, its accounting profits are believed to depend heav-
ily on the terms that govern its contracts with KEPCO.
It will be interesting to compare operating eﬃciency of various SOEs as
well as that of SOEs and large private firms, almost all of which were chae-
bol aﬃliated until very recently. However, direct comparison of, say, costs of
operation turned out to be quite complicated and seems beyond the scope
of this paper.18 Comparison of profitability based upon accounting data
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16. Fees are for watching TV programs produced and aired by Korea Broadcasting System.
17. Korea Broadcasting System oﬀers two main channels, one of which provides advertise-
ments.
18. In almost all cases, SOEs operate in completely diﬀerent industries. Further, most com-
mercial SOEs are monopolistic and do not have private competitors providing the same ser-
vices competing with them. In addition, cost data of many chaebol firms turned out to be false,
and are being corrected. An empirical analysis of the comparative eﬃciency of SOEs and
chaebol firms that takes these factors into account is beyond the scope of this paper.
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also has its limitation, as most SOEs are monopolistic while most of chaebol
firms face competition in their industries. In this paper, we will not attempt
to directly compare operating eﬃciency of SOEs and chaebol firms and will
only compare various financial ratios, which can serve as indirect signals.19
The “Big Four” (the Big Six minus KOGAS and Korea Heavy) are the
most important commercial firms owned by the Korean government. They
consistently turn out large profits and generally sustain stable growth.
Table 4.3 shows the profits earned by the top thirty performers among the
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19. We believe that a meaningful analysis can be accomplished by comparing Korean firms
with their counterparts in other countries. Such a comparative study seems to be appropriate
for a separate research.
Table 4.3 Profit Leaders among Listed Companies (unit: 0.1 billion won)
Rank Company Profit
1 Samsung Electronics 60,145
2 KEPCO 17,925
3 POSCO 16,369
4 KT 10,101
5 SK Telecom 9,506
6 Hyundai Motors 6,678
7 Samsung SDI Co. 5,439
8 LG Electronics 5,021
9 Kia Motors 3,307
10 LG Chemical 3,248
11 LG Chemical Investment 3,248
12 KT&G 2,704
13 Shinhan 2,631
14 Hanil Synthetic Fiber 2,592
15 SK Telecom 1,447
16 LG Construction 1,235
17 Hyundai Mobis 1,131
18 Anam Electronics 1,081
19 Hanwha 1,056
20 Dongbu Construction 1,039
21 KOGAS 944
22 PacInd 847
23 LG Industrial System 823
24 Hyundai Dept. Store 801
25 Samsung Corp. 750
26 Pungsan 729
27 HITE Brewery 701
28 Shinsegae 697
29 Kumkang Korea Chemical 677
30 Inchon Iron and Steel 635
Source: Korea Stock Exchange (December 2000).
Note: See table 4.1 for explanation of abbreviations.
listed companies in 2000. KEPCO, POSCO, and KT ranked second, third,
and fourth after Samsung Electronics. Table 4.3 may be biased in favor of
nonpublic enterprises because it is based upon accounting reports of the
listed companies. It has been discovered in the aftermath of the economic
crisis that accounting reports of many private companies contained serious
flaws. Accounting reports from public enterprises have never been subject
to allegations of serious wrongdoing. Thus, the Big Four could be in an
even more dominant position if standard accounting practices had been
used.
As of April 2001, KT ranked fourth after Samsung Electronics, SK Tele-
com, and Korea Exchange Bank in terms of the size of the market capi-
talization among listed firms.20 KEPCO ranked fifth and was immediately
followed by POSCO. KT&G and KOGAS ranked fourteenth and 
twenty-seventh, respectively. In terms of the percentage of market capital-
ization to the total market capitalization of all listed firms, KT, KEPCO,
POSCO, KT&G, and KOGAS recorded 8.6, 6.4, 4.1, 1.3, and 0.5 percent,
respectively.21
Combined, the Big Six, and certainly the Big Four, fared better than the
market average in terms of their financial performance. Table 4.4 compares
the returns on investment, interest coverage ratios, and debt-equity ratios
of the Big Six public enterprises with the market average of the listed com-
panies. Earnings per share for the Big Six were consistently higher than the
market average of the listed companies, both before and after the economic
crisis. Weak performance of KEPCO and KOGAS in 1997 is due to the
large appreciation of the dollar against the Korean won that occurred that
year during the economic crisis. KEPCO had a large portion of loans ex-
pressed in foreign currencies, while KOGAS imports all of the natural gas
it sells from abroad.
With respect to interest coverage ratios and debt-equity ratios, which be-
gan receiving increasing attention as key financial indices since the onset of
the crisis, the public enterprises fared significantly better than their coun-
terparts in the private sector. Four public enterprises show debt-equity ra-
tios that are far below the market average.22 The high debt-equity ratio of
KOGAS is due to the high rate of investment using borrowed money that
resulted from expansion of the national gas transmission network. Interest
coverage ratios of the public enterprises have been much higher than the
market average. Weak performance of KEPCO in 1997 is due to the rapid
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20. SK Telecom used to be a subsidiary of KT, but became a subsidiary of SK Group after
1994.
21. Samsung Electronics, SK Group, and Korea Exchange Bank recorded 16.2, 8.8, and 8.7
percent, respectively.
22. The interest coverage ratio of a firm is defined to be the amounts that the firm has to pay
as interest on its debts divided by the operating profit (before paying interests) in a given year.
A firm earns a gross profit that is just enough to pay interests when its interest coverage ratio
is equal to 1.
depreciation of the Korean won. Thus, the public enterprises do not seem
to be facing the possibility of serious financial trouble, which has threat-
ened a large part of the corporate sector since the mid-1990s.
4.4 1997 Special Act on Privatization: A First Step toward Privatization
Most of the large SOEs that exist today were formed in 1980s or earlier.
The system by which SOEs operate was also formed in the mid-1980s and
remained unchanged until the end of the Roh Tae Woo administration.
There did not exist significant demand for privatization either; reason for
this low demand can be summarized as follows. First, there was a general
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Table 4.4 Financial Ratios of the Big Six Public Enterprises
Classification/Company 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Net income to stockholder’s equity ratio
KT&G 8.63 9.24 11.23 11.01 9.76
POSCO 9.49 –2.27 9.87 17.15 17.36
KOGAS 16.36 –48.76 13.03 10.14 4.04
KT 0.21 0.60 2.93 2.81 8.84
KEPCO 3.15 –3.62 6.29 4.84 5.63
Doosan Heavy Industries and Construction Co. 15.21 –7.90 4.41 1.56 –1.49
Weighted average of listed companies 2.96 –16.04 –8.69 –8.17 0.25
(627) (630) (625) (570) (628)
Weighted average, excluding Big Six firms 1.9 –22.74 –15.25 –15.08 –3.41
Interest coverage ratio
KT&G 469.21 467.03 443.77 1729.72 912.41
POSCO 2.75 0.97 3.13 8.07 7.60
KOGAS 3.09 –1.55 1.78 2.49 1.50
KT 3.27 2.11 3.02 4.01 4.80
KEPCO 2.02 –0.16 2.91 3.23 2.95
Doosan Heavy Industries and Construction Co. 4.91 0.67 2.18 1.27 0.50
Weighted average of listed companies 1.31 0.36 0.75 0.70 1.30
(627) (630) (625) (570) (628)
Weighted average, excluding Big Six firms 1.18 0.34 0.62 0.48 1.04
Debt-equity ratio
KT&G 24.79 31.53 24.85 29.01 38.08
POSCO 118.50 160.48 118.85 89.59 88.41
KOGAS 230.23 555.79 273.70 184.22 259.02
KT 189.34 223.98 192.33 75.69 103.32
KEPCO 112.89 185.23 175.23 111.50 102.70
Doosan Heavy Industries and Construction Co. 186.91 243.66 127.35 139.11 113.50
Weighted average of listed companies 265.31 415.35 316.43 199.73 205.52
(627) (630) (625) (570) (628)
Weighted average, excluding Big Six firms 326.41 532.08 382.75 246.20 253.14
Source: Korea Development Institute.
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are the number of firms in the sample. See table 4.1 for explanation of
abbreviations.
consensus that SOEs were the only feasible, and probably the most eﬃ-
cient, way to build much-needed infrastructure, such as national telecom-
munications, electricity, gas networks, and highway networks. Second,
chaebols that had been given various subsidies from the government con-
centrated on expanding their territory in export industries as well as some
domestic industries that lay outside of the domains of SOEs. Third, there
was little understanding of how diﬀerent economic systems worked at the
time. There were few bureaucrats or politicians who could distinguish be-
tween commercial objectives and the public goals of an SOE. Fourth, there
was no political pressure to privatize SOEs.
In 1994, the Kim Young Sam administration, during its second year in
power, commissioned a comprehensive study of several public enterprises,
including KEPCO, KT, POSCO, and KT&G. It is not clear what moti-
vated the study. However, one can point out the following changes in the
economic environment, which appear to have aﬀected the change in the
government’s attitude toward SOEs. First, most of the basic infrastructure
investment was completed in most of the industries mentioned above. Sec-
ond, chaebols had been given a more favorable and generous treatment
from the Roh administration, and gained freer access to the financial mar-
ket. Third, privatization somehow became one of the key economic poli-
cies of the Kim Young Sam administration, which kept pushing for a tan-
gible outcome. It is worth noting that financial losses of SOEs were not a
factor behind the push for privatization, as all SOEs subject to the study,
except for Korea Heavy, were very profitable.
The study reviewed, among other things, the possibility of privatizing
each of the public enterprises. The results of the studies for KT&G,
POSCO, and KT generally concluded that a significant degree of loss of
eﬃciency existed due to their governance structures and that privatization
would produce more eﬃcient outcomes. By the end of 1996, a consensus
was building up within the government that privatization was needed for
some of the commercial public enterprises.
The possibility of privatizing large public enterprises immediately raised
the question of whether chaebols should be allowed to purchase controlling
interests. At that time, the problem with selling public enterprises to chae-
bols seemed only political in nature, as there existed a widespread strong
sentiment against handing over the large, commercial public enterprises to
chaebols.23 It appears that most policymakers at the time believed that it
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23. At that time, there were few, if any, who expected that the economic crisis was on its way.
The economic crisis revealed that chaebol were able to set up and maintain control of large
firms only by heavy government intervention in the financial market. It also revealed that
chaebol were neither particularly eﬃcient nor able to raise capital needed to purchase con-
trolling interests of large firms on their own through proper market mechanisms. In fact,
many chaebol went bankrupt. After the economic crisis, the chaebol issue began to be ana-
lyzed from a very diﬀerent angle.
was politically unfeasible to allow chaebols to acquire controlling inter-
ests.24 Thus, it was decided that chaebols would not be allowed to take con-
trol of the public enterprises to be privatized.
The government forecast quite correctly that a large-scale sale of the
shares of large public enterprises to domestic investors would be diﬃcult to
achieve. Large-scale sale to foreign investors was also excluded from con-
sideration for a variety of reasons. As a consequence, it appeared inevitable
that the government had to maintain dominant ownership of large public
enterprises for quite a while. Thus, there arose the question about the gov-
ernance of the commercial public enterprises that would eventually be pri-
vatized during the period in which the government remained a major
shareholder. The need for the separation of public policy objectives from
the commercial operation of the public enterprises was also acknowledged
for the first time. The 1997 Special Act on Privatization was introduced to
address these issues.
The act targeted four public enterprises, KT&G, KT, KOGAS, and
Korea Heavy, and had two main elements. First, it put restrictions on the
ownership of all four public enterprises in order to prevent chaebols from
acquiring controlling interests. Specifically, the act required that the
combined share of any investor, including the shares held by the parties
who are in intimate relations with the investor, should not exceed 15 per-
cent of each of the four public enterprises.
Second, the act prescribed an Anglo-Saxon-style corporate governance
structure for the four public enterprises. The act stipulated that the board
must consist of only civilians, thus removing the presence of the line min-
istry as well as the Ministry of Finance and Economy25 from the board. It
also gave the board power similar to that of a typical board in large firms
in the United Kingdom or United States. The act even contained detailed
procedures for selecting chief executive oﬃcers, which were aimed at guar-
anteeing transparency in the selection process.
In addition, the Framework Act was amended to exempt KT&G, KT,
and KOGAS from the application of the act, thus making them GICs, even
though the government’s share in each of these companies exceeded the 50
percent benchmark. Further, the KT Act and KT&G Act were abolished.
These two measures removed many of the constraints rooted in the policy-
related concerns of the line ministry that bound the commercial operation
of KT and KT&G, thus basically making them private common-stock
companies subject to company laws. Legally, they diﬀered from a private
company only to the extent that they were subject to the Special Act and
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24. Their assessment seems to have correctly reflected the political reality.
25. There was a change in the government itself in which the Economic Planning Board
merged with the Ministry of Finance to form the Ministry of Finance and Economy. The au-
thority of the old Economic Planning Board concerning public enterprises was passed on to
the newly formed ministry.
the industry acts. The KOGAS Act was left intact because its line ministry
(the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy, or MOCIE) success-
fully argued that the KOGAS Act was needed to enable MOCIE to com-
plete the national gas-transmission network within the target period. Thus,
KOGAS was freed from the constraints given by the Framework Act, but
was left to the control of the line ministry and its policy concerns.
The spirit of the act was clear. The act envisaged that the four public en-
terprises would develop into large, commercial, private firms to be run by
professional managers who strive to maximize the shareholders’ monetary
interests. It also recognized the need for the separation of policy concerns
from commercial operation and attempted to restrain the line ministries in
their dealings with the public enterprises. The act was quite successful in
achieving the goals that were the motivation behind the act. By prohibiting
chaebols from acquiring controlling interests of the four public enterprises,
it ended a long dispute that worked as a barrier to privatization, and thus
enabled privatization to proceed.26 The act also allowed the three former
GOCs, in particular KT and KT&G, to be run basically as profit-seeking
firms. Finally, it installed a corporate governance mechanism that was in
line with large profit-oriented firms, at least on the surface.
However, the Special Act and the other privatization measures intro-
duced in 1997 were far from a complete privatization package and even
contained some crucial flaws. The act failed to completely sever the ties
with policy consideration and allowed the line ministry to maintain share-
holders’ rights. It also contained a clause that explicitly stated that the
management of the public enterprises must consider public policy objec-
tives when making decisions. Such clauses are not consistent with the rest
of the act or its spirit. The clause that leaves the shareholders’ rights in the
hands of the line ministry left the door open for the line ministry to inter-
vene in the management of public enterprises to promote its policy con-
cerns. The act also left the four public enterprises subject to audits by the
Oﬃce of the Inspector General and the National Assembly.27
Another criticism directed at the privatization measures taken in 1997
concerned the target firms. It was diﬃcult to understand why POSCO was
not included in the list of target firms, while KT&G and Korea Heavy
were included, as there were few public policy objectives with which one
could identify POSCO.28 Exclusion of KEPCO also was hard to under-
stand considering that KT and KOGAS were included and that KEPCO
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26. I believe that it also provided part of the solution to the chaebol problems, although few
were aware of the issue at the time, and the act did not intend to solve the fundamental prob-
lems associated with the chaebol. It was revealed later on that the expansion of the chaebol
groups, based upon financial transactions that lack transparency and accountability, was one
of the main culprits for the recent economic crisis.
27. Private firms are not subject to such audits.
28. For instance, one of the functions KT&G performed on behalf of the government was
subsidizing the tobacco-growing farmers in Korea.
had the highest proportion of private ownership among the three network
giants.
It is also worth noting that regulatory reforms accompanying the partial
privatization of KT by the Special Act have not occurred. The Communi-
cations Commission had existed not as an independent regulatory body,
but as a part of KT’s line ministry, the Ministry of Information and Com-
munications (MIC). The commission was not even given the authority over
regulating rates and access charges, which was handled directly by the
MIC. Little changed on the regulation front after the Special Act took ef-
fect. The same was true for the gas and electricity industries.
Overall, the special act was incomplete as a privatization measure. It
even failed to secure logical consistency in some respects, as mentioned
above. As a result, it was only half successful in inducing the eﬀect of pri-
vatization. However, it was the greatest step in the direction of privatiza-
tion ever taken by Korea until that time. It also opened a new chapter in
corporate governance of large, commercial enterprises in Korea, as it was
the first-ever attempt in Korea at installing an advanced form of corporate
governance in large firms. At the time, corporate governance was not even
an issue for private firms as most people took for granted the absolute con-
trol by dominant shareholders of chaebol firms.
4.5 Privatization Drive after the Economic Crisis
4.5.1 Privatization Plan of 1998
In March 1998, a new government succeeded the Kim Young Sam ad-
ministration at the peak of the economic crisis. The new government had
to implement measures aimed at reducing employment and the size of op-
erations of many private firms and financial institutions that were bank-
rupt to rehabilitate them. There was political pressure from labor and
chaebols alike that the bureaucracy should share the pain as well. At the
time, it was generally acknowledged that SOEs had sizable room for im-
proving eﬃciency, although they were in good financial health, unlike
private firms. Thus, the new government introduced measures aimed at re-
structuring public enterprises in its early days in power. The focus was
given to reduction in unneeded workers, removal of redundant operations,
and sales of assets and businesses of public enterprises that were not es-
sential for operation.
Privatization received secondary attention as it was acknowledged to be
more diﬃcult than restructuring, involving plans on market structures and
regulatory frameworks. However, some within the new government ex-
pected that they would eventually have to sell SOEs to raise money to cover
the costs of corporate and financial restructuring. There was also a need to
raise foreign capital to increase the foreign currency reserve, the depletion
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of which was believed by many to have caused the economic crisis.29 Con-
trary to what many believe, neither the International Monetary Fund nor
the World Bank played a significant role in shaping policies on public en-
terprises in Korea.
The Budget and Planning Commission, a new government agency cre-
ated by the new administration, announced an ambitious privatization and
restructuring plan that covered 108 public enterprises.30 The 1998 plan
classified public enterprises into three groups and prescribed diﬀerent so-
lutions for each of them.
The first group is the set of public enterprises to be privatized. POSCO,
Korea Heavy, Korea Chemical, KTB, and Korea Textbook were included
in this group, along with twelve subsidiaries of various GOCs and GICs.
The second group consists of the public enterprises that eventually need to
be privatized, but would not be privatized in the near future. It includes
KT, KT&G, KEPCO, KOGAS, Daehan Oil Pipeline, and Korea District
Heating, as well as twenty-eight subsidiaries of GOCs and GICs. The third
group is the set of public enterprises that would not be privatized. Thirteen
GOCs were included as well as fourteen subsidiaries of some GOCs and
GICs.
The Ministry of Planning and Budget’s (MPB’s) prescription for the first
group of public enterprises was to turn the shares of each over to private
hands and let the new owners run them based upon profit incentives. It is
noteworthy that, in the case of Korea Heavy, the government changed the
previous administration’s policy on chaebol ownership of large public en-
terprises. The government subsequently amended the Special Act and ex-
cluded Korea Heavy from the list of public enterprises covered by the act.
The main reason for this change was the government’s realization that the
best and probably the only feasible way to privatize Korea Heavy was
through a trade sale or sale of controlling interests to a single party.
For the second group, gradual privatization was proposed as the solu-
tion. The meaning of “gradual privatization” was unclear from the mo-
ment it was announced and has never been well understood. The GOCs
and GICs belonging to the second group were all monopolistic firms in
network industries, except for KT&G. Privatization of monopolistic public
enterprises in the network industries requires a wide range of changes in
regulatory and industrial policies. It could also lead to fundamental
changes in the organization of the line ministries. Privatization of KT&G
also inevitably entails a fundamental change in the industrial policies for
the tobacco-growing industry, which could prove to be a diﬃcult task. It
seems that the MPB acknowledged the need to privatize those public en-
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29. Even many chaebol firms tried to sell assets and businesses of some of their firms to meet
the demands by the government to increase liquidity, reduce debts and costs, and raise foreign
capital.
30. The commission changed its name to the Ministry of Planning and Budget a year later.
terprises, but also realized that their privatization requires complex and
far-reaching changes in regulatory and industrial policies that were be-
yond its control when it announced “gradual privatization” as the solution
to the second group of public enterprises.
For the third group of public enterprises, privatization was not an op-
tion. The MPB’s solutions for the third group of public enterprises were in-
ternal restructuring or liquidation. Some public enterprises were deter-
mined to lack public policy concerns that could justify their existence as
public enterprises as well as any marketable commercial value. Hanyang
was the best example. It was determined to be liquidated. Most other
public enterprises belonging to the third group were allowed to continue to
operate as before, but were subject to a heavy dose of the internal restruc-
turing program, which entailed a large reduction in employment and in the
scope of the business.31
The 1998 privatization plan (see table 4.5) was far more comprehensive
in scope and depth than any other privatization eﬀort by the previous ad-
ministrations. The 1998 privatization plan has changed considerably in the
implementation stage. However, it served as the skeleton of the new ad-
ministration’s policy for public enterprises.
4.5.2 Other Measures and Recent Developments in Privatization
Special Act
The new government left most of the contents of the Special Act intact.32
Thus, the ceiling on the ownership of some of the large public enterprises
was left unchanged, as was the governance structure for them. The share-
holders’ rights of the government in the public enterprises covered by the
act were still left to the line ministries. The government kept making
changes to the list of public enterprises to be covered by the act. Korea
Heavy was later dropped, as mentioned above, while some smaller public
enterprises were added.
Framework Act
The new administration amended the Framework Act and changed the
governance structure of GOCs to the one specified by the Special Act.
Thus, GOCs are now governed by a board whose members are recruited
from outside the government. The new governance structure could be con-
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31. Intense shake-ups also fell on most of the public enterprises belonging to the other
groups as well. To a certain degree, such shake-ups were taken to cut unnecessary costs that
were due to ineﬃcient management of the public enterprises. The scope and depth of re-
structuring of the public enterprises also appear to have been aﬀected by the onset of the eco-
nomic crisis.
32. Korea Heavy was excluded from the act, as mentioned earlier. There also were some
other relatively minor changes.
flicting with the other aspect of the Framework Act that is based upon the
idea that a GOC is a policy instrument of its line ministry rather than a
profit-oriented firm. It is not clear to us how the board, which consists of
those outside the government, can make sure that GOCs are run smoothly
to achieve the policy objectives of the line ministry.
Regulatory and Industrial Policies
Not a great deal of changes occurred in the way line ministries go about
their business of promoting policy objectives since the privatization began.
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Table 4.5 Privatization Plan of 1998
Solutions/Targeted GOCs and GICs Targeted Subsidiaries of GOCs and GICs
Complete privatization
Pohang Iron and Steel Co. 12 subsidiaries, including KT Card Co. and
Korea Heavy Industries and Construction Co. Hanyang Wood Co.
Korea General Chemical Co.
Korea Technology Banking Corp.
National Textbook Co.
Subtotal = 5
Gradual privatization
KT 28 subsidiaries, including KT Powertel Co., 
KT&G Korea Liquefied Natural Gas Co., and Korea
KEPCO Power Engineering Co.
KOGAS
Daehan Oil Pipeline Corp.
Korea District Heating Corp.
Subtotal = 6
Restructuring
Agricultural and Fishery Marketing Corp. Restructuring
Korea Coal Corp. 6 subsidiaries, including KT Freetel Co. and 
Korea Highway Corp. Korea Nuclear Fuel Co.
Korea Land Corp.
Korea National Housing Corp.
Korea National Oil Corp.
Korea Resources Corp.
Korea Security Printing and Minting Corp. Liquidation or merger
Korea National Tourist Org. 8 subsidiaries, including Hanyang Corp. and 
Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency Korea Real Estate Trust Co.
Korea Water Resources Corp.
Rural Development Corp.
Korea Appraisal Board
Subtotal = 13 (14  subsidiaries)
Total = 24 (54  subsidiaries)
Source: Ministry of Planning and Budget.
Notes: GOC = government-owned corporation; GIC = government-invested corporation. See table 4.1
for explanation of other abbreviations.
Separation of commercial elements of commercial public enterprises and
regulatory functions of the government from the industrial policies of the
line ministries in network industries has not even been discussed much. In
particular, the regulatory environment for the telecommunications and gas
industries has little changed. Further, the communications commission
has not been granted independence. The MIC, which also assumes the role
of the dominant shareholder of KT, still has the authority to regulate rates
and access charges. The market structure and regulatory scheme of the gas
industry have not changed much either.
However, there has been a significant change in the policies toward the
electricity industry and KEPCO. After two years of study and debates, the
government successfully passed the Act for the Restructuring of the Elec-
tricity Industry. As a result, KEPCO was split into six generating compa-
nies (gencos), a monopolistic firm vertically integrated in the transmission
and distribution stages, usually called “post-KEPCO”33; and the pool mar-
ket. The government also made public its intention to ultimately split post-
KEPCO into one monopoly for the transmission stage and several local
monopolies for the distribution stage.
Finally, a regulatory body—the Electricity Commission—has been es-
tablished within the line ministry, MOCIE, and was given the authority to
regulate the electricity industry. Although the commission is not indepen-
dent of MOCIE, it was charged with the responsibility to regulate rates.
Thus, the Electricity Commission appears, at least on the surface, to be a
quite legitimate regulator, unlike the Communications Commission.
The restructuring is still in its early stage. Sales of gencos to a third party
independent of post-KEPCO have yet to occur either. Thus, it is too early
to tell whether the reform of the electricity industry is a success. It is also
too early to tell whether the Electricity Commission, which is only two
months old, will perform properly and independently as a regulator.
Recent Developments in Tobacco, Telecom, 
Oil Pipeline, and District-Heating Industries
The 1998 privatization plan went through a few changes in the imple-
mentation stage. The biggest changes were made with regard to KT&G
and KT, both of which had been classified as public enterprises to be grad-
ually privatized. The government changed its plan and added those two, as
well as two other smaller public enterprises (Daehan Pipeline and Korea
District Heating) initially classified as those for gradual privatization, to
the list of firms to be fully privatized.
The government also made changes aimed at separating industrial pol-
icy concerns from the commercial operation of KT&G. The government
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33. The oﬃcial name of the monopoly is still KEPCO, but many call it “post-KEPCO” to
distinguish it from the old monopoly, vertically integrated in all stages of the industry.
abolished the statutory ban on entry into tobacco manufacturing and is
scheduled to open the market in late 2001.34 Thus, foreign as well as do-
mestic competitors will be able to compete with KT&G on more level
terms in Korea. At the same time, the government also gave up the right to
control the prices of cigarettes produced by KT&G so that the prices of
cigarettes would be determined in the market.
These liberalization measures and privatization of KT&G would un-
doubtedly have significant impact on the tobacco-growing industry of Ko-
rea. KT&G is expected to reduce purchase of tobacco leaves from domes-
tic growers each year until its purchase from domestic growers drops to a
certain level. It will also reduce the subsidies that it has given to the asso-
ciation of tobacco-growing farmers for a long time. KT&G and the asso-
ciation of tobacco growers are currently working on a deal that will require
KT&G to make a lump-sum donation to a foundation to compensate for
the losses to the association and tobacco growers, resulting from privati-
zation and liberalization of the tobacco industry.
The change in policies toward KT came about as a result of a string of
events that few had anticipated. The twist began in 1999 when the govern-
ment announced its plan to grant three licenses to operate G-3 mobile
services, usually called IMT-2000 in Korea, in 2000. The announcement
catapulted the five mobile operators, of which four were suﬀering from
losses while the incumbent SK Telecom was earning huge profits, into an
intriguing game of mergers and acquisitions played out by competitors in
a tight oligopoly. Shinsegi and Hansol ended up oﬀering themselves as
merger and acquisition targets. SK Telecom successfully acquired Shinsegi
Telecom. Korea Telecom Freetel, a subsidiary of KT, and LG Telecom,
aﬃliated with the LG Group (the fourth largest chaebol group in Korea),
competed fiercely to acquire controlling interests of Hansol. Korea Tele-
com oﬀered more attractive terms than LG and eventually bought 44.1
percent of the shares of Hansol, thus becoming an undisputed second af-
ter SK Telecom in the mobile market.35
Purchase of controlling interests in Hansol Telecom by KT was probably
the first-ever case of a public enterprise voluntarily acquiring a major
private firm that was not bankrupt, and thus became the subject of an in-
tense controversy. The criticism directed at KT was that it was not even
classified by the government as an enterprise to be privatized and should
not be allowed to purchase control of a private operator, as there was a
Recent Developments in the Public-Enterprise Sector of Korea 117
34. Conditions for a license to operate a manufacturing facility in the tobacco industry are
being drawn up.
35. Becoming the largest and second-largest operators in terms of revenue or, equivalently,
the number of subscribers, was considered by many to be a key factor in winning a license for
3G services at the time. SK Telecom and KT came out as winners in reality. They won the two
licenses for users of the asynchronous-mode standard. LG competed with the two for a license
for asynchronous-mode standard operators and failed. LG has not won a license yet.
private suitor willing to purchase Hansol. On the other hand, if the gov-
ernment prohibited KT from making bids on Hansol, it would almost cer-
tainly cause serious damage to the competitiveness of KT and its market
value, while at the same time forcing Hansol to sell its shares to LG at less
favorable terms. In the end, the government decided to allow KT to go
ahead and make a bid on Hansol. At the same time, the government an-
nounced that it would completely privatize KT by mid-2002.36
Thus, KT is to be privatized earlier than any other large, commercial
public enterprise. However, there have not been fundamental changes in
the regulatory frameworks or in the way industrial policies are promoted
by the line ministry.
4.5.3 Divestitures and Ownership Distributions
For all the GOCs except KEPCO, the government is essentially the sole
owner. In cases where the government’s share is below 100 percent, the
shares not owned by the government are owned by other public institutions
controlled by the government. The government did not own a single share
in Korea Chemical and Korea Heavy in 1997, nor does it now; but these two
firms were classified in 1997 as GICs by the government as their dominant
shareholders were public institutions that the government could easily con-
trol. The government’s shares in POSCO, KTB, and Korea Textbook were
reduced to zero between 1997 and 2000. KTB and Korea Textbook have
been completely privatized. However, POSCO is not generally viewed as a
fully privatized company because its largest shareholder is the Industrial
Bank of Korea, which is a public enterprise controlled by the government.
Table 4.6 summarizes the ownership distributions for the Big Six as of
December 2000. KEPCO is still 52.2 percent owned by the government. Of
the remaining shares, 26 percent are owned by foreign investors. Further
dilution of the government’s share is not likely to occur for a while because
most of the loans that KEPCO borrowed from foreign creditors have a
condition in the loan contracts that allows the creditors to call for early
payments if the government’s share falls below 50 percent. There is no ma-
jor investor other than the government.
The government’s share in KT is 59 percent. However, it will drop to less
than 30 percent if the current eﬀorts by the government to sell additional
shares to foreign investors succeed. The government is also planning to sell
oﬀ the remaining shares by 2002. Kookmin Pension, the largest pension in
Korea, is the second largest shareholder after the government. The re-
maining shares are owned by a few financial institutions as well as many
small investors. Foreign ownership stands at 19.4 percent.
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36. The discussions above suggest that KT was already an operator that was as commercial
in nature as any others in the telecom business were. The government may have simply ig-
nored this obvious fact until it was too awkward to continue to ignore it.
Korea Tobacco and Ginseng
The government’s share in KT&G was close to 100 percent before the
onset of the crisis. Its ownership kept decreasing after the onset of the eco-
nomic crisis to the current level of 13.8 percent, as a result of a series of gov-
ernment investments in several banks using the KT&G shares. The pur-
pose of the investments was to increase the size of the equities as well as the
Bank for International Settlements ratios of the banks and other financial
institutions, which were necessary from the perspective of financial and
corporate restructuring. The banks that own KT&G shares were not ex-
pected to actively exercise their rights as major shareholders, and the gov-
ernment can still control 53 percent of the shares. Small investors and var-
ious financial institutions own around 15 percent.
Pohang Steel Company
The government sold its remaining 3 percent in 2000 and currently does
not own a single share in POSCO. But it is believed to be able to control
POSCO through its influence over the Industrial Bank of Korea, which is
the largest single shareholder with 4.9 percent. It is not clear at this point
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Table 4.6 Main Shareholders of the Big Six and Their Shares (December 2000)
Company Main Stockholders
KOGAS Korean government: 26.9%
KEPCO: 24.5%
Local government: 9.8%
Daeshin Securities: 7.2%
Foreigners: 2.1%
KT&G Korean government: 13.8%
Industrial Bank of Korea: 35.2%
The Export-Import Bank of Korea: 7.0%
Daehan Investment Trust: 7.0%
Foreigners: 5.0%
POSCO Industrial Bank of Korea: 4.9%
Foreigners: 48.6%
KT Korean Government: 59.0%
Foreigners: 19.4%
KEPCO Korean Government: 52.2%
Korea Deposit Insurance Corp.: 5.1%
Foreigners: 26.0%
Korea Heavy Industries and Construction Doosan Corp.: 36.0%
Co., Ltd. (Doosan Heavy Industries and Korea Development Bank: 12.6%
Construction Co., Ltd.) KEPCO: 11.7%
Source: National Information and Credit Evaluation.
Note: See table 4.1 for explanation of abbreviations.
whether the corporate governance of POSCO will remain as it is or whether
a chaebol would be allowed to take control. POSCO has not been subject
to the Special Act.
Korea Gas Corporation
KOGAS used to be owned by the government, KEPCO, and various lo-
cal governments, which initially owned 50.2, 35.5, and 14.3 percent, re-
spectively. KOGAS became listed after a public oﬀering in which 38.8 per-
cent was sold to institutional investors and small investors.37 The shares
held by the government, KEPCO, and local governments were reduced to
26.8, 24.4, and 9.8 percent, respectively, as a result of the oﬀering. KOGAS
is still controlled by the government.
Korea Electric Power Corporation
The Korean government owned more than 70 percent of the shares of
KEPCO until 1996. An additional sale of KEPCO shares in 1998 lowered
the government’s share to 58.2 percent, while it increased the shares held
by general investors to 36.4 percent. The government sold an additional 5
percent of depository receipts (DRs) for US$750,000,000 in 1999, further
reducing its share to 53.2 percent. The shares held by foreign investors were
a meager 1.14 percent in 1992, but increased to 10.99 percent in 1995 and
26.11 percent in 2000.
Korea Heavy
Korea Heavy used to be owned by KEPCO, Korea Development Bank,
and Korea Exchange Bank, with 40.5, 43.8, and 15.7 percent, respectively.
The government fully controlled Korea Heavy using its dominant position
in all of the three public enterprises. In 2000, the government forced
KEPCO and Korea Development Bank to sell 28.8 percent and 31.2 per-
cent, respectively, of Korea Heavy (a total of 60 percent of the outstanding
shares) to a chaebol consortium, the employees’ ownership program, and
the general investors. Doosan Group purchased 36 percent, while the Em-
ployee Ownership Plan (EOP) and the general investors purchased 10 per-
cent and 14 percent, respectively. Doosan appears to be in a position to
wield control of Korea Heavy.
Korea Telecom
Divestiture of KT started in 1993. During the 1993–1996 period, the
government attempted to sell 49 percent of KT shares, but were able to sell
only 28.8 percent for 2.751 trillion Korean won to domestic investors. In
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37. Daeshin Securities ended up owning 7.2 percent of KOGAS since it was the main bro-
ker in the last public oﬀering of KOGAS and had an obligation to maintain the share price
above a certain level.
1999, the government sold 14.4 percent to foreign investors through issu-
ing DRs that were listed on the New York Stock Exchange and London
Stock Exchange and reduced its shares from 71.2 percent to 56.8 percent.38
The sales brought in US$2.48566 billion, of which US$1.14723 billion
went into the government coﬀer. Another eﬀort at selling additional shares
domestically early in 2001 was unsuccessful. As of July 2001, the govern-
ment was trying to sell up to 15 percent of shares to a foreign strategic in-
vestor and an additional 17.8 percent to investors in the international mar-
ket through issuing DRs. The government sold the remaining shares to
private investors in 2002.
The largest shareholder after the government is Kukmin Pension, with 3
percent. No other shareholder owns more than 1 percent. There are two re-
strictions on the ownership of KT shares in addition to the 15 percent ceil-
ing for any single party. First, the Telecommunications Industry Act puts a
ceiling on the combined ownership in KT by foreign investors at 49 per-
cent. Second, the act also forbids a foreigner to become the largest share-
holder of KT. The last restriction on the ownership of KT was introduced
to maintain KT as a Korean firm. But no such restriction exists for SK
Telecom or any other telecom operator in Korea.
Other, Smaller Public Enterprises
Of the smaller GOCs and GICs, four relatively small GICs have been
completely privatized since the privatization drive of the current adminis-
tration began in early 1998. All of the government’s shares of KTB and Ko-
rea Textbook have been sold to a venture capital and a private textbook
company, respectively. Korea Chemical was not sold as a whole. Instead,
the government forced Korea Chemical to sell its major business unit,
Namhae Chemical, which was also the only unit within Korea Chemical
that had any economic value, to Farmers’ Association (Nonghyup).39 Dae-
han Pipeline has also been sold to a consortium of investors headed by the
SK Group, which has a refinery and oil distribution subsidiary.
The results of the new administration’s privatization program are far
more extensive and thorough compared with those of preceding adminis-
trations. However, the privatization process is far from complete and is still
unfolding. Large public enterprises are not fully privatized. Although a few
small public enterprises are fully privatized, they have been in private
hands for less than three years. Thus, it is not possible to conduct a mean-
ingful evaluation of the eﬀects of privatization in Korea, similar to the one
oﬀered by Galal et al. (1994).
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38. Of the 14.4 percent, 6.7 percent were old shares, while the remaining 7.7 percent were
newly issued ones.
39. There is the question of whether this was a bona fide privatization. Farmers’ Associa-
tion is a nonprofit organization and is considered by many to be no better than other public
enterprises in terms of eﬃciency.
4.6 Other Government Involvement in Commercial Activities 
and in the Financial Market
The public enterprises that we have covered thus far in this paper com-
prise only a fraction of the larger set of commercial organizations that are
owned and controlled by the government. The government fully owns and
runs the postal service and rail transportation as government agencies. The
postal service is a part of the MIC organization. Korea Rail, the monop-
oly in the rail and rail transportation industry, is an agency within the Min-
istry of Construction and Transportation. Local governments have set up
a large number of local public enterprises. The best known example is City
Rail of Seoul, which continually posted large losses.
The area in which the government’s ownership and control is the most
crucial, but has been neglected in this paper, is the financial sector. The gov-
ernment has been the dominant player in the financial sector over the past
four decades, frequently allocating financial resources to the projects that
it favored. The government actually owned and directly controlled many fi-
nancial institutions, including several banks and their subsidiaries, even be-
fore the economic crisis hit Korea in 1997. The government had a control-
ling interest in Korea Development Bank, Korea Housing Bank, Kookmin
Bank, and Industrial Bank of Korea. It utilized these banks and their sub-
sidiaries as instruments for its policies toward the financial market.
The government also was somehow able to wield tight control over the
banks in which it had no or few shares. Most of the commercial banks and
their subsidiaries had been tightly controlled by the government, despite
the fact that chaebols were the largest shareholders of the banks prior to the
onset of the economic crisis.40 It is worth noting that although chaebols
owned a large share of banks, they were not allowed to wield control of the
banks. However, the chaebols ended up being able to obtain large amounts
of loans from the banks anyway, as they were aided by government that in-
tervened in the management of the banks. It was revealed later on that a
large proportion of the loans made to many chaebols this way turned out
to be lost in unprofitable projects. The result was the massive bankruptcies
of large firms, which immediately translated into deep financial diﬃculty
of many banks and financial companies. Roughly one-third of the chaebol
firms became insolvent or fell in deep financial trouble since 1997.41
Many banks and nonbank financial institutions have been closed since
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40. There was a 5 percent ceiling on the individual ownership of commercial banks before
the onset of the crisis. Major chaebol, such as Samsung or Hyundai, owned large shares of the
banks while meeting the 5 percent constraint. The government somehow succeeded in pre-
venting large shareholders from participating in the governance of the banks, taking on the
role itself.
41. The list of casualties includes such well-known names as Hanbo, Kia, Dong A Con-
struction, Halla, Jinro, and many Daewoo firms (including Daewoo Motors and Daewoo
Corporation). Recently, Hyundai Construction was also added to this list.
1998. Most of those that survived had to be recapitalized by the govern-
ment’s money and ended up being mostly owned by the government. Thus,
much of the financial sector has been nationalized, while parts of the cor-
porate sector dominated by public enterprises have been privatized. Fur-
ther, most of the large chaebol firms that went bankrupt or fell into serious
financial trouble ended up being owned by the banks or placed in court re-
ceivership. Large firms in which the banks became major shareholders su-
ﬀer from the absence of a proper governance mechanism, as the banks
themselves are not equipped with a well-functioning governance mecha-
nism.
Firms in court receivership are basically governed by the judges and run
by trustees who are appointed by the judges. While judges in Korea are
generally trustworthy and competent in enforcing laws, they are not busi-
nessmen and have little incentive, other than their sense of responsibility
to society, to try to make the firms commercially successful. Trustees also
appear to face an incentive structure that often leads them to enjoy the
perks of a chief executive oﬃcer rather than to try to turn the firms around
and sell them to prospective investors. Firms in court receivership some-
times appear to be another breed of public enterprise that lacks a proper
corporate governance structure based upon well-defined profit motives.
The banks and other financial institutions that have been nationalized,
as well as the bankrupt firms that are in court receivership or are controlled
by creditor institutions, need to be recognized as public enterprises that
should be privatized. Thus far, the government has privatized only First
National Bank, which essentially became nationalized after going through
bankruptcy and recapitalization with the government’s money. In addi-
tion, a sizable proportion of shares of some banks, including Kookmin
Bank, was sold to foreign investors. However, it will take quite a while to
completely privatize the banks and establish a well-functioning system of
financial regulation. Privatization of the firms in court receivership or in
workout programs is not an easy task, either.
4.7 Concluding Remarks
Korea has made significant progress in privatizing the commercial busi-
nesses owned by the government. Korea’s approach to commercial public
enterprises and their privatization diﬀers, in several respects, from that of
New Zealand and the United Kingdom or other European countries that
are going through large-scale privatization. In those countries, the govern-
ment separated the policy concerns from the public enterprises to be pri-
vatized. However, that was not the case in Korea. Rather, privatization
policies were mostly focused on divestiture and often lacked concrete plans
on a broader set of issues concerning industrial organization of the rele-
vant markets and the policies thereupon.
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In network industries, privatization policies focused on partial sales of
the shares owned by the government and did not pay much attention to the
industry structure, competition policies, or regulatory frameworks. The
policy environment was, by and large, left intact, as were the functions and
organizations of the line ministries. These diﬀerences are probably due to
the way the government is organized and operates in Korea. Line min-
istries of commercial public enterprises in Korea have long been granted
the authority to intervene in the relevant industries to promote a wide
range of policy objectives. Separation among commercial operation of the
public enterprises to be privatized, regulatory functions of the government,
and the industrial policies of the government probably require a funda-
mental change in the way the line ministries operate, and more generally in
the way the government is organized and operates. It appears that Korea
was not ready to make such a change in the way the government is organ-
ized and operates with regard to privatization.
Another crucial factor that aﬀected the privatization path of Korea is
the absence of a properly functioning financial market and adequate cor-
porate governance systems for large firms. Extensive reliance on the chae-
bol system and the accompanying heavy government intervention in the fi-
nancial market during the past four decades deprived the financial sector
of a fair chance of developing into a well-functioning market. The only
governance systems that existed in Korea for large firms were essentially
ownership and control by the government or control by chaebol families
that depended crucially upon heavy government intervention in the finan-
cial market.
In fact, the chaebol system can be viewed as a device that uses a handful
of families as artificial corporate-governance agents. Key chaebol firms
were established with the money borrowed from banks as a result of inter-
vention by the government in the banking sector. Thus, it was eventually
the government and not the chaebol families who took the risks in invest-
ing key chaebol firms. Actually, it turned out after the onset of the eco-
nomic crisis that the government indeed covered the losses of the banks
and the chaebol firms when chaebol firms went bankrupt.
It would be unrealistic to expect the chaebol system, which is based on a
government-controlled financial sector and lack of transparency and ac-
countability, to produce an eﬃcient outcome. In fact, section 4.3 showed
that chaebol firms performed quite poorly. It seems quite clear that the
chaebol system is not a plausible alternative for privatizing large SOEs in
Korea. In fact, chaebol firms, which are already heavily leveraged, do not
have enough money to purchase controlling interests in large SOEs. The
only way to sell SOEs to chaebols would be by lending them money and let-
ting them play the role of artificial corporate-governance agents. This is ac-
tually the way chaebol families obtained control of the firms under their
control now.
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A more proper mode of privatization needs to be developed. Developing
a new mode of privatization requires establishing a new mode of corporate
governance in large firms and financial institutions in Korea. Korea has yet
to come up with a model of corporate governance for large, commercial
firms that can be relied upon by a majority of investors. For this to occur,
the financial market must be made to work based upon sound profit in-
centives of banks and other financial companies as well as eﬀective pru-
dential supervision.
The financial market in Korea is going through a fundamental change
after the recent economic crisis, which was caused at least in part by the
lack of proper governance systems in large firms and financial institutions.
Korea’s chance of successful privatization crucially depends on whether
and how fast it can turn around its financial market, which in turn de-
mands the adoption of a stable and eﬃcient governance model by large
corporations in the real as well as financial sectors.
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Comment Cassey Lee Hong Kim
Nam’s ambitious survey paper succeeds in discussing the diﬀerent types of
public enterprises that exist in South Korea and the reforms that these en-
tities have undergone in the past four years. I will confine my comments to
the reform process because the paper raises several interesting questions in
this area. The most obvious one has to do with the question of why South
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Korea took so long to implement economic reforms in the public enter-
prise sector. Compared to other countries, South Korea is a relative late-
comer to the economic reform scene. While many countries have embarked
on privatization programs since the early 1980s, South Korea only began
privatizing its public enterprises in 1997.
The first question brings us to a second related question: that is, what
were the main driving forces underlying these reforms? There is some evi-
dence that eﬃciency gain was an important motivating factor. For ex-
ample, one piece of legislation that made reforms possible in 1997 was an
act that had the revealing title the “Act for Privatization and Improvement
of the Eﬃciency of Large Public Enterprises” (or the Special Act on Pri-
vatization). But it is hard to believe that eﬃciency gains alone could con-
vince politicians to undertake reforms. Economic reforms of public enter-
prises require tremendous political willpower for the simple reason that
they generate significant public concern. In the case of some countries, eco-
nomic reforms could take place only with the emergence of strong new
political leadership, as was the case with Britain (under Thatcher) and
Malaysia (under Mahathir). In the case of South Korea, were there any
changes in its political regime that made possible these reforms of its public
enterprises?1
The author identifies two waves of reform of public enterprises in South
Korea. Each episode of reform was undertaken by a new political admin-
istration. The first wave began in 1994 when the government commissioned
a study of several public enterprises. This culminated in the passage of the
Special Act on Privatization in 1997. The seed for the first wave of reform
was planted as far back as 1993, when Kim Young Sam became the first
democratically elected civilian president since the military coup d’etat of
1961. Kim Young Sam rode in on a reform ticket during the election and,
a month after coming to power, the newly elected president unveiled two
reform packages: the One Hundred–Day New Economy Plan and the Five-
Year Plan for the New Economy. Even though these plans did not recom-
mend privatization of public enterprises, they inevitably led to it, because
the central motto of both plans was “small government” and “respect for
the private sector’s creativity and vitality.”
How successful was the first wave of reform? The main objective of the
first wave was to transform a few selected public enterprises into profit-
oriented firms with good (read: Anglo-Saxon) governance structure. Even
though Nam’s paper does not explicitly take a stand on this issue, one gets
the distinct feeling that the reforms were of limited success on several ac-
counts: public policy continued to exert influence in the selected firms; too
few firms were involved; and no regulatory reforms were carried out. In the
126 Il Chong Nam
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paper, Nam does mention two major constraints to reforms: the desire to
exclude chaebol participation and limited equity-acquisition capacity of
domestic investors. Aside from this, one is left to wonder about the bu-
reaucratic and political constraints as well.
By 1997, the political support for the Kim administration began to un-
ravel with industrial unrest, economic crisis, and political scandals. This
culminated in South Korea’s seeking an emergency loan package of US$21
billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in November 1997.
It is under this scenario that the veteran opposition leader Kim Dae Jung
won the December 1997 election. Thus, the second wave of reforms that
began in 1998 was undertaken under a very diﬀerent environment—a new
political administration, economic crisis, and the IMF. I think it would be
interesting to know how each of these factors influenced the extent and
speed of reforms of public enterprises after 1998. For example, was priva-
tization an issue on Kim Dae Jung’s election agenda? Was privatization
perceived as having a role to play in the resolution of the economic crisis?
Did the reforms demanded by the IMF agreement include reform of public
enterprises?2 On the last question, there is some evidence that suggests that
privatization in the immediate aftermath of the economic crisis in 1997 was
not aﬀected by the standby agreement between the South Korean govern-
ment and the IMF. A perusal of the letter of intent that the South Korean
government sent to the IMF, dated 7 February 1997, shows that it concen-
trated on issues such as macropolicies, financial restructuring, capital ac-
count liberalization, trade liberalization, labor market reform, and corpo-
rate governance reforms.3
The second wave of reform remains unfinished. But in the three years
since its commencement, the privatization record has been a mixed one.
Nam’s paper shows that the divestitures carried out were not suﬃciently
extensive to reduce the government’s ability to intervene in companies.
Nam points out that the limited success of recent reforms arises from not
having paid attention to issues pertaining to industry structure, competi-
tion policies, and regulatory frameworks. But looking at Korea’s develop-
ment experience, one would imagine that an extensive change in a short
time would not have been possible without tearing apart the country’s so-
cial and economic fabric.
Many of the economic problems that South Korea faces today are a
legacy of a very comprehensive and consistent implementation of a state-
led industrialization policy for at least three decades (since the 1960s). The
government essentially took control and harnessed the resources of both
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the financial sector and public enterprises to support the development of
large conglomerates (chaebols). In Nam’s paper, it is evident that chaebols
remain an important factor even when we discuss the reforms of public en-
terprises. Because they have such a strong presence in the economy it is
diﬃcult to see how they can be excluded unless a long-term policy of re-
ducing their role in the Korean economy is undertaken. For example, if fur-
ther reforms of public enterprises require a move away from a bank-based
to a financial-market-based financial system, then parallel changes in cor-
porate finance will be required. But such changes are far from easy to carry
out. South Korea’s recent experience is an example. It appears that during
the first wave of reform (1994–1997), the chaebols were excluded from par-
ticipating in the reforms of public enterprises partly on account of their
dismal track record and their involvement in political scandals in the pre-
vious political regimes. But after this period, it is possible that politicians
and policymakers have increasingly realized that these entities are too im-
portant to exclude unless one can muster enough sustainable political sup-
port to alter the role of chaebols in the Korean economy. Recent develop-
ments, such as relaxation of the ownership limit on chaebols in financial
institutions, seem to indicate this to be the case. Hence, chaebol reform lies
at the heart of successful reforms in both the financial system and the
public-enterprise sector. All this will depend on the emergence of a politi-
cal environment that is supportive of the implementation of extensive re-
forms that incurs the risk of de-industrialization and reduced competitive-
ness.
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